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Shadow Budgets, Fiscal Illusion and  
Municipal Spending:  
The Case of Germany1 
Abstract 
The paper investigates the existence of fiscal illusion in German municipalities with 
special focus on the revenues from local public enterprises. These shadow budgets tend 
to increase the misperception of municipal tax prices and seem to have been neglected 
in the literature. Therefore, an aggregated expenditure function has been estimated for 
all German independent cities applying an “integrated budget” approach, which means 
that revenues and expenditures of the core budget and the local public enterprises are 
combined to one single municipal budget. The estimation results suggest that a higher 
relative share of local public enterprise revenues might increase total per capita spend-
ing as well as spending for non-obligatory municipal goods and services. Empirical evi-
dence for other sources of fiscal illusion is mixed but some indications for debt illusion, 
renter illusion or the flypaper effect could be found. 
 
JEL classification: H72, L32, H71 
Keywords: fiscal illusion, municipal enterprises, panel data regression 
                                                 
1  I would like to thank Joachim Wilde, Sabine Freye, Herbert S. Buscher and other colleagues as well 
as participants at the Annual Meeting of the European Public Choice Society 2009 in Athens for 





Shadow Budgets, Fiscal Illusion and 
Municipal Spending: 
The Case of Germany 
Zusammenfassung 
Der Beitrag untersucht die Existenz von fiskalischer Illusion auf der Ebene der deutschen 
Gemeinden, und zwar mit besonderem Schwerpunkt auf den Einnahmen kommunaler 
Unternehmen. Diese Nebenhaushalte begünstigen unter Umständen die Fehlwahrneh-
mung der kommunalen Steuerpreise, ein Effekt der bisher in der Literatur eher ver-
nachlässigt wurde. Zur Überprüfung dieser Hypothese wurde eine aggregierte Ausga-
benfunktion für alle kreisfreien deutschen Städte geschätzt. Dabei kam ein „integrierter 
Haushaltsansatz“ zum Einsatz, d. h. die Einnahmen und Ausgaben des Kernhaushalts 
sowie der kommunalen Unternehmen wurden in einem einzigen Gemeindehaushalt zu-
sammengefasst. Die Schätzergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass ein höherer Anteil von 
Erträgen aus kommunalen Unternehmen sowohl die gesamten städtischen Ausgaben pro 
Einwohner als auch die Ausgaben für freiwillige Selbstverwaltungsaufgaben erhöht. Die 
empirischen Befunde für andere Arten der Fiskalillusion sind uneinheitlich, doch konn-
ten zumindest einige Anzeichen für Schuldenillusion, Mieterillusion und den so genann-
ten „Fliegenfängereffekt“ gefunden werden. 
 
JEL-Klassifizierung: H72, L32, H71 






Shadow Budgets, Fiscal Illusion and 
Municipal Spending: 
The Case of Germany 
1  Introduction 
There has been a long and still ongoing discussion in the literature about the existence 
and the empirical verification of fiscal illusion. The voluminous literature seems to have 
focused on the misperception of tax burdens (e.g. the Mill hypothesis) or the flypaper 
effect. For useful surveys of the earlier but still relevant literature see for example Oates 
(1988) or Dollery and Worthington (1996). 
Other methods of making revenues or expenses less visible to the voters and taxpayers 
have been stressed less in the literature – such as the establishment of “shadow” budgets 
at the local government level. This mainly refers to the possibility of shifting revenues, 
expenses and debt from the core budget to local public enterprises and therefore, veiling 
the actual extent of the local governments´ financial transactions. This may also have 
stimulating effects on expenditures because it is easier for the vote-maximizing local 
politicians to increase debts or to cross-subsidize certain public services. Furthermore, 
public  utilities,  but  also  other  local  public  enterprises  facilitate  some  kind  of  “tax-
exporting” because they often provide services to customers outside the boundaries of 
their municipality. Especially the effects of public utility profits on local government 
spending  have  been  investigated  by  Di  Lorenzo  (1982),  Deno  and  Mehay  (1982), 
Stumm (2000) or Haug and Nerré (2008). Dollery and Worthington (1999) included in 
their regression analysis a dummy variable indicating the reliance on public utility reve-
nue among other potential indicators for fiscal illusion in Australian municipalities. 
This paper presents a systematic analysis of the effects of “shadow budgets” and several 
other causes of fiscal illusion on local public spending for German cities, similar to that 
of Dollery and Worthington (1999). This is the first empirical study of this kind for 
Germany – at least to the author´s knowledge – especially with respect to what might be 
called the “integrated budget approach”. The expenditures and revenues both of the lo-
cal core budget and of the local municipally-owned enterprises are taken into account. 
This is necessary because especially in larger cities local public enterprises (public utili-
ties, municipal housing companies, public transport companies, theatres, opera houses 
etc.) of considerable size exist. According to Reidenbach (2006), these units sometimes 
carry out up to 50% of a city´s total public investment. 
The number of empirical studies dealing with fiscal illusion problems in Germany is 
very limited. Nam (2005) examined the effects of fiscal illusion on economic develop-





government level focused on local tax competition (e.g. Büttner 2003) or effects of fis-
cal equalization systems. Other studies deal with the efficiency analysis of local public 
service provision in Germany (Geys, Heinemann and Kalb 2008 or Kalb 2008). All of 
these empirical studies for the German local level include only the core budget and neg-
lect the expenditures and revenues of local public enterprises. 
This paper is not intended to proof or reject the adequacy of the popular median voter 
model for German local governments. In this context it seems to be of minor importance 
that the key assumptions of this model – the median voter´s vote is decisive and the me-
dian voter is also the voter with the median household income – have been repeatedly 
challenged in the literature (e.g Epple and Romano 1996, Aronson and Wikstrom 1996 
Fletcher and Kenny 2008, Brunner and Ross 2009). In the German case, the main ob-
stacle for the application of the median voter model at the local level is that actually no 
counterpart to the property taxes in several Anglo-Saxon countries or the local income 
taxes in the Scandinavian countries or in Switzerland exists. Thus, there is no local tax 
which could be interpreted as a tax price for specific or bundles of different local public 
goods. Consequently, the regression equation used in the empirical section of this paper 
represents rather an expenditure function assembling demand and supply determinants 
of municipal spending than a demand function for local public services. Despite of the 
problems applying the median voter model to German local governments this does not 
mean that there is no connection between voter preferences and public expenditures. 
The focus of this paper lies on the following main research questions: 1) What effects 
has the relative importance of shadow or secondary budgets represented by municipal 
enterprises on the local government´s total spending decisions? 2) Are there any indica-
tions for other kinds of fiscal illusion at the German local level? 3) What other determi-
nants of local public spending are relevant? 
The paper is structured as follows: First, a condensed overview of certain kinds of fiscal 
illusion and the problems of their empirical analysis will be given. In section three the 
estimation method, the potential indicator variables and the data set will be described 
and the empirical results will be presented. Finally, some conclusions will be drawn and 
an outlook on future research work will be given. 





2  Fiscal Illusion: Definition and Previous Research Work 
According to Mueller (2003, p. 527), fiscal illusion means that government by disguis-
ing the burden of financing can extend the budget more than people would like to pay 
voluntarily. Usually fiscal illusion refers to the revenue side of the budget: The taxpay-
ers are assumed to underestimate the true tax prices of public services. Nevertheless, 
there might be some illusion on the expenditure side as well (Oates 1988, p. 78). For 
example, the fragmentation and complexity of the expenditure structure may also add 
considerably to the misperception of the budget size (Turnbull 2007). 
Therefore, the main causes for fiscal illusion are information asymmetries between vot-
ers and politicians as well as between politicians and bureaucrats. Hence, fiscal illusion 
might be either demand-side or supply-side driven: It is not only the underestimation of 
the  tax  prices  that  causes  excessive  demand  for  local  public  goods.  The  budget-
maximizing bureaucrats of the Niskanen-type or alternatively, the slack-maximizing bu-
reaucrats (Wyckoff 1999) might abuse their information advantage to increase the sup-
plied quantity of certain public services or at least the cost of a given quantity (and 
therefore the expenditures). 
It is quite useful for the following empirical investigations to adopt the classification of 
fiscal illusion suggested by Wallace Oates. Oates (1988) identified five categories or 
hypotheses of fiscal illusion tested in the empirical literature:2 1) Complexity illusion: 
Misperception of the tax prices results from the complexity or fragmentation of the rev-
enue system. 2) Renter illusion: Renters are unaware of the property taxes or other local 
taxes or fees for local public goods embodied in their rents and might therefore support 
higher public spending than homeowners. The degree of fiscal illusion depends on the 
proportion of homeowners in a given jurisdiction. 3) Income elasticity illusion: Tax 
payers do not perceive built-in tax increases due to progressive income tax rates (or 
more general: income-elastic revenue sources) as clearly as legislative changes in the 
revenue system. 4) Debt illusion: Except for a world consistent with the Ricardo-Barro 
equivalence theorem of public debt, citizens tend to underestimate the future burdens of 
public debt. 5) The “flypaper” effect or money sticks where it lands first: Public ex-
penditures are increased much more by grants (conditional or unconditional) to the cor-
responding levels of government than by an equivalent increase of the citizens´ income. 
The main focus of interest of this paper lies on the first category complexity illusion be-
cause it directly relates to municipal enterprise operations (Stumm 2000, p. 62) and the 
illusions caused by outsourcing of expenditures and revenues to municipal enterprises. 
The other potential causes or categories of fiscal illusion will also be examined, except 
for 3). This type of fiscal illusion seems to be more important for the national level. Ac-
tually, it has been neglected so far in the studies dealing with local government spend-
ing. 
                                                 





The existing international empirical literature usually perceives fiscal illusion as a reve-
nue or expenditure side problem without consideration of the benefits of publicly pro-
vided goods. According to Oates (1988, p. 68) and Dollery and Worthington (1996, 
p. 262) empirical studies in the field of fiscal illusion have either taken the form of es-
timations of ad hoc expenditure functions or apply demand functions for public goods. 
Both approaches include variables that are assumed to capture the illusion effects. Ex-
amples of the first are Wagner (1976), Breeden and Hunter (1985), Misiolek and Elder 
(1988) or Stumm (2000). Median voter demand functions for public goods were esti-
mated by Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), Pommerehne and Schneider (1978), Wilda-
sin (1989), Campbell (2004) or Turnbull (2007). More recently, some experimental stu-
dies have tested for fiscal illusion (e.g. Sausgruber and Tyran 2005). 





3  Empirical Analysis 
3.1  The Empirical Model 
For the empirical analysis an aggregated per capita municipal expenditure function is 
estimated to model the possible relationship between local governments’ expenditures 
and their various determinants of the usual reduced form spending function. Turnbull´s 
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  (1) 
The operational per capita spending E/  is assumed to be a function of the perceived tax 
price, Tp; median household income, Y
M; population,  ; J sources of transfer- or quasi-
transfer payments, Tr
j; K index numbers indicating the potential misperception of sever-
al  revenue  sources,  ϕ
k  and  L  socioeconomic  or  political  variables  z
l.  The  subscript  
i = 1 to I marks the number of groups (local governments) and t = 1 to T the time period, 
eit is the disturbance term. The time-invariant unobserved group-specific effect of each 
local government is captured by αi. It seems reasonable to assume that there might be 
significant and time-invariant differences between cities or municipalities affecting lo-
cal government spending. These differences do not only result from different city sizes 
or  different  legal  frameworks.  It  is  mainly  the  “personal  heterogeneity”  –  different 
people with different mentalities, preferences etc. – which makes each city incompara-
ble even to its neighbors. 
Deviating from Turnbull´s approach no equilibrium tax price will be integrated in the 
model. Following Henrekson (1988, pp. 107-108), there is little reason to believe that 
the perceived price for local public services on the demand side and the price fixed on 
the supply side by the local government should ever adjust to equilibrium. Furthermore, 
as previously mentioned unlike for example the USA, Switzerland or the Scandinavian 
countries there is no suitable local tax in Germany which is a) paid by the majority of 
the voters and b) reasonably high to act as a sort of comprehensive tax price for a spe-
cific local public good (e.g. educational services in the U.S. school districts) or a bundle 
of local public goods. The German local property tax (Grundsteuer) on agricultural and 
non-agricultural land as well as on residential and non-residential buildings is extremely 
low because the assessed property value is based on imputed rents or construction prices 
of the years 1964 (West Germany) or even 1935 (former GDR).3 Therefore, the proper-
                                                 
3  The fact that – to the author´s knowledge – no official or commercial data on the average property 
tax burden on residential or non-residential buildings in German cities is available indicates that 
owners and renters consider the property tax to be a rather negligible cost factor. For example, ac-





ty tax revenues cover only a very small fraction of the total local government expendi-
tures. 
Furthermore, some of the elements included in the median voter model might have de-
mand as well as supply-side effects in Germany. This refers particularly to the median 
or average household income. On the one hand, we have the usual income elasticity of 
demand for local public goods which is expected to be positive, but could be negative as 
well. On the other hand, a rising median or average household income increases ceteris 
paribus the national income tax revenue of which the local governments receive approx-
imately  15%.  This  additional  tax  revenue  might  enable  them  to  further  extend  the 
supply of local public services. 
All in all, (1) represents rather an expenditure function including demand and supply 
components simultaneously than a demand function for local public goods resulting 
from the median voter model despite of including some of its elements.  
Unlike in the United States, Switzerland or other countries neither data for the median 
household income nor for the median tax price was available for German municipalities.  
Instead, the average property tax revenue per inhabitant 
  
   nd the average disposable 
household income 
 
  per inhabitant had to be used. To avoid collinearity problems,   
was removed from the regression equation. According to the literature, a positive effect 
of the household income on local per-capita public spending might be expected, whe-
reas the effect of the average property tax is rather undetermined. 
To test for the different categories of fiscal illusion listed in Section 2, the following in-
dicators have been used: 
Complexity illusion and the effect of local shadow budgets: In other empirical studies in 
the field of fiscal illusion the authors usually employ some Herfindahl indices of tax 
revenues or expenditures as indicators for the misperception of the revenue or expendi-
ture structure. This has been avoided here for two reasons. First of all, the main focus of 
this paper lies on the potential effects of shadow budgets represented by local public en-
terprises and not on the effects of the fragmentation of the revenue or expenditure side. 
But even more important is the fact that calculating a Herfindahl index would involve 
an unjustifiable arbitrariness in grouping the revenues and/or the expenditures. Actually, 
the official categorization system for municipal revenues and expenditures in the core 
budget, which has to be applied (with little regional modifications) by all German muni-
cipalities, is much more detailed than the municipal enterprises´ profit and loss state-
ments. For example, the operational and financial revenues are grouped into three main 
groups at the one-digit level with about 26 subgroups at the two-digit level and about 90 
sub-subgroups at the three-digit level. In contrast, the average profit and loss statement 
                                                                                                                                               
occupied house with 120 sqm floor area is about 280 Euro – although the local property tax rate (to 





of municipal enterprises contains a total of about 25 items (incomes and expenses!). It is 
also common for municipal enterprises to book grants received (except for investments) 
as sales revenues, which makes it impossible to identify them like the grants received 
that are included in the core budget. 
Because of these grouping and identification problems another complexity indicator is 
used instead: the ratio of municipal enterprise revenues (including sales, changes in in-
ventories, capitalized own-account services, other operating income, interests and in-
come from shareholdings) to total municipal revenues. This ratio is highly correlated 
with the ratio of expenses/expenditures of municipal enterprises to total municipal ex-
penditures. Thus, no separate measure for the complexity of the expenditure structure 
was used in the regression. All in all, a rising share of revenues from public enterprises 
might also increase local government spending; the sign of the regression coefficient is 
expected to be positive. 
Debt illusion: To check for the debt illusion hypothesis, debt per capita 
 
  is included in 
the regression. D consists of the long- and medium term liabilities of the municipal en-
terprises and the municipality´s “regular” debt. In addition, the ratio municipal enter-
prise liabilities to total municipal debts is also used. Both indicators are expected to in-
crease public spending and the sign of their regression coefficient should be positive. 
Flypaper effect: The per capita values 
   
   mostly consist of the grants received by the 
local government from the German Länder or other local governments/associations of 
local governments. Furthermore, the revenue from the local business tax (trade tax, Ge 
werbesteuer) is treated as a transfer payment. The trade tax is the most important local 
tax source in Germany. Due to generous exemptions for sole proprietorships and part-
nerships and its deductibility from personal income tax only a small fraction of enter-
prises (and inhabitants) effectively contributes to the trade tax revenues. This makes it 
very suitable for shifting the costs of local public services to a minority, whereas all cit-
izens share the benefits. On the other hand, the most important trade tax payers might 
gain significant influence on local government policy, for example by threatening the 
local politicians with the relocation of their production activities. The latter could lead 
to insufficient tax rates and therefore insufficient local public spending. This aspect is a 
core subject of the abundant literature on tax competition and beyond the scope of this 
paper.4 Hence, while the effect of increasing per capita grants received on local public 
spending should be positive (as well as the sign of the coefficient in the regression equa-
tion), the total effect of high trade tax revenues on local public spending is not deter-
mined ex ante. 
Renters´ illusion: The first-best solution would have been to use the share of homeown-
ers at the total number of eligible voters or inhabitants. Due to the lack of adequate data 
                                                 





the percentage of residential buildings with up to two accommodation units serves as a 
proxy for the percentage of homeowners among the inhabitants. The expected effect of 
this proxy variable on municipal spending should be negative as well as the expected 
sign of the coefficient in the estimated regression equation. 
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  (2) 
It has been already mentioned that at the local level in Germany the core budget does 
not contain all the operational expenditures and investments of a municipality. To neg-
lect the expenditures and revenues of municipal enterprises, would distort the regression 
results. For example, the local public utilities are no isolated items because their profits 
are usually shifted to the local public transportation companies to cover their losses (and 
avoid the local trade and the national corporation tax). Although these profits often do 
not appear in the core budget, the cities consider them as additional revenues to finance 
other important local goods and services. Therefore, deviating from e.g. Stumm (2000) 
the net revenue transfers from municipal enterprises to the municipal core budget are 
not considered to be the only or main cause for fiscal illusion in this context. Even more 
important seems to be the fact that outsourced revenues and expenditures are less visible 
to voters and even to local politicians – whether they result in revenue transfers to the 
municipal core budget or not. 
Furthermore, expenditures of different municipalities are incomparable if there are dif-
ferent “outsourcing” levels of expenditures to municipal enterprises. To illustrate the 
problem, let us have a look at cultural services. According to the statistics of the Ger-
man Theatre and Opera Association (2008) on the legal structures of 143 public (i.e. not 
privately owned) German theatres and opera houses, in 2006 37 (25.9%) were munici-
pal departments (Regiebetrieb), 28 (19.6%) semi-autonomous municipal agencies (Ei 
genbetrieb), 46 (32.2%) public limited companies (GmbH). 22.4% consisted of special 
purpose associations (Zweckverband), public law incorporations (Anstalt des öffentli 
chen Rechts), registered associations (eingetragener Verein) or public-law foundations 
(Stiftung des öffentlichen Rechts). The often rather subtle differences between these or-
ganizational forms do not really matter in this context. But it is important to know that 
only for the municipal departments the total expenditures and revenues are included in 
the core budget of the municipality. For all other organizational forms, only transfer 
payments (grants, compensations) between municipality and organizational unit are in-
corporated in the core budget. Therefore, if only the expenditures on theatres etc. in the 
core budget were taken into account, the expenditures in cities with theatres that are not 
organized as municipal departments would be systematically underestimated. This prob-





Thus, the dependent variable total operational expenditures E included 1) all operational 
(non-investment) expenditures of the core budget (the „Verwaltungshaushalt“) except 
for purely financial transactions and interest payments and 2) the operating expenses 
(excluding interest expenses as well as depreciation and amortization) of local public 
enterprises5. Interest payments and financial transactions have been neglected because 
they only account for the source of financing for public capital. Depreciation and amor-
tization have not been taken into consideration, too because they are capital costs and 
only expenses – not expenditures. The core budget does not include expenses that are 
not also expenditures and adding the core budget expenditures and the municipal enter-
prise expenses (including depreciations) together would lead to a serious bias in favor of 
the municipal enterprises. 
A major challenge in this context was to eliminate the transactions between the core 
budget and the municipal enterprises to avoid double counts. This was mainly achieved 
by subtracting the compensations for goods and services provided from/to municipal en-
terprises as well as the transfer payments for non-investment purposes from/to munici-
pal enterprises in the core budget. 
Last but not least, several socioeconomic and political variables, which are exogenous 
for the local governments – at least in the short run – and are expected to have signifi-
cant effects on demand or supply of local public goods, have been included in the re-
gression. They all have in common that their effect on public spending and therefore the 
expected sign in the regression analysis cannot be predicted ex ante. 
•  Population density: Usually correlates significantly with city size and might have 
a negative effect on per capita spending due to scale effects. On the other hand, 
increasing population density might lead to negative agglomeration effects such 
as crime, poverty or pollution and therefore increase per-capita spending on pub-
lic safety, welfare etc. 
•  Political significance of “left wing” parties: Left-wing politicians are supposed to 
be more generous in government spending than conservative or liberal politicians. 
But they often gain majorities in communities with severe economic problems, low 
tax revenues and below average household incomes and are therefore subjected to 
rigorous budget constraints. In Germany, clusters of cities with left-wing majorities 
can be found in the Ruhr area and in Eastern Germany. The share of left-wing city 
councilors (including Social Democrats as well as members of the Party of Demo-
cratic Socialism and the Greens) is employed for the regression. 
•  Political  fragmentation:  In  city  councils  with  fragile  majorities  depending  on 
multi-party coalitions any party might abuse its power of breaking up the coali-
tion  by  obtaining  extra  public  expenditures  to  please  their  favorite  lobbyists. 
                                                 
5  Municipal hospitals have not been considered for the analysis. Although the independent cities as 
well as the rural districts in Germany are legally obligated to provide these services, hospitals do not 
affect their budgets significantly: The statutory or private health insurance compensate them for most 





Consequently, the total per capita expenditures of politically fragmented cities 
are expected to be higher than e.g. in cities with one party holding the majority of 
the seats in the city council. But similar to the significance of left-wing parties 
the political fragmentation tends to be significantly higher in economically de-
pressed cities facing severe budget constraints in Eastern Germany, especially 
due to the presence of the Party of Democratic Socialism (since 2007 “The Left”) 
which attracts potential voters of the Social Democrats. In the following regres-
sion the political fragmentation of a city council is measured by a Herfindahl in-
dex using the squared shares of six different political parties in the city council.6 
•  Fraction of elderly people: A higher fraction of elderly persons might decrease 
the demand for educational services but increase the demand and therefore the 
expenditures for certain social services like old people’s homes. The total effect 
cannot be predicted ex ante. 
•  Fraction of young people: A higher fraction of inhabitants under 20 increases 
demand (at least their parents´ demand) for educational services or certain leisure 
services but reduces the demand for services consumed primarily by grown-ups. 
This selection certainly does not include all possible structural variables which might 
determine local public spending. One could think of other variables such as the unem-
ployment rate, the share of foreigners, the share of people of a certain religious denomi-
nation or the presence of private non-profit organizations7 which offer substitutes for 
local goods and services. Fortunately, these group-specific effects are captured by α in 
the regression equation. 
In addition to the effects on total operational spending, it would also be interesting to 
analyze the effects of fiscal illusion on the local government´s “voluntary” or at least 
not obligatory spending on culture, sports, science (not schools!) or leisure services. 
This differentiation is important for countries – like Germany – where local politicians 
and their lobbyists usually complain that most of their spending was determined by EU, 
national or state laws and regulations. Therefore, a second regression was estimated 
employing the operational expenditures on the aforementioned goods and services as 
the dependent variable. These expenditures were calculated analogously to the total ex-
penditures. The recreational area per inhabitant was added to the regression as a further 
possible determinant with a positive effect on the voluntary expenditures. 
                                                 
6  These are the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU), the Social Demo-
crats (SPD), the Greens, the Liberal Democrats (FDP), the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) and 
“others”. The category “others” is very heterogeneous because it contains all other minor parties 
ranging from the extreme right to the extreme left of the political spectrum as well as the members of 
local voters associations.  
7  It should be noted that the presence of e.g. kindergartens run by churches or other private non-profit 
organizations does not necessarily reduce municipal spending on those services. In fact, German 
municipalities are obliged to provide and finance certain services at a given quality and quantity. 
They have to compensate the non-municipal providers for their expenditures. Things might be dif-
ferent for voluntary expenditures. But even privately organized clubs are often heavily subsidized by 





It was implicitly assumed for equations (1) and (2) that the standard One-way Fixed Ef-
fect Model (FEM) with group dummies and a log-linear regression would be most ap-
propriate for the panel data regression of the expenditure function. The results of the 
standard test procedures carried out for the data set described in Section 3.2 supported 
these assumptions with respect to the FEM but not for the functional form. The F-Test 
comparing the pooled OLS-model and the FEM rejected the hypothesis that all αi are 0 
(F[109,500] = 25.24).  The  Breusch-Pagan  Lagrange-Multiplier  test  (χ
2[1] = 719.92) 
suggested to avoid the pooled OLS-model in favor of the random effects model. The 
Hausman test statistic (χ
2 [13] = 42.18) rejected one basic assumption of the random ef-
fects model (REM): Unobserved group specific effects included in the disturbance term 
are uncorrelated with the regressors. Therefore, the FEM seemed to be the best choice. 
But the log-linear model is not the appropriate functional form – at least not for the total 
expenditures. According to a test suggested by Box and Cox, the sum of squared resi-
duals (SSR) divided by the squared geometric mean of the dependent variable for the li-
near model (1.722) is significantly lower than the SSR of the log-linear model (2.307), 
which is supported by the relevant test statistic (χ
2 [1] = 39.93). Thus, the linear FEM 
fitted the data better than the log-linear model.8 
Furthermore,  the  Wald  Test  (F [1, 110] = 11.34)  suggested  by  Wooldridge  (2002, 
pp. 282-283) rejected the hypothesis that no first order autocorrelation between the dis-
turbances was present at the 1% significance level. Consequently, the appropriate model 
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  (3) 
with eit = ρeit 1+ εit as the error term. 
Things turned out a bit different for the voluntary expenditures, although the F-Test and 
the LM-test showed similar results. But the basic assumption of the REM was not re-
jected by the Hausman-Test (χ
2 [14] = 11.97) for the log-linear model and with similar 
results for the linear model. Furthermore, the log-linear function turned out to be the 
more adequate functional form: The SSR divided by the squared geometric mean of the 
dependent variable for the linear model (27.67) was significantly higher than the SSR of 
the log-linear model (15.54). The corresponding test statistic strongly (χ
2 [1] = 181.5) 
supported this finding.9 Finally, the Wooldridge-Test (F[1, 106]) = 8.4) suggested the 
presence of a first order autocorrelation process for the log-linear model. Equation (4) 
shows the log-linear REM including an AR(1) process for the disturbance term. 
                                                 
8  See Griffiths et al. (1993, pp. 345-346) for further details. 
9  This  test  could  not  be  applied  to  the  REM  so  the  FEM  was  used  instead.  However,  the  cross-
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with eit = ρeit 1+ i + εit as the error term including the unobservable and time-invariant 
group-specific effect  i. 
3.2  Data 
A dataset of all 112 German cities10 not belonging to a district (independent cities, 
kreisfreie Städte) was constructed for the years 1998 to 2003 including 672 observa-
tions. (See Table 1 for the descriptive statistics.) This restriction was necessary because 
data for local public enterprises was not available before 1998 and after 2003. Unfortu-
nately, for two German Länder (Rhineland-Palatinate 1998, Schleswig-Holstein 1998 to 
2000) and one town in Bavaria 1998 no data was provided to or collected by the statis-
tical offices. This reduced the number of observations suitable for the regression to 
64711. Furthermore, one small town in Southern Bavaria (Kempten) turned out to be an 
extreme outlier (probably due to some erroneous data) and was also excluded from the 
regression. The number of observations declined further for the log-linear model (volun-
tary expenses) because observations with obviously implausible or negative values for 
some variables have not been incorporated in the regression. 
The financial statements of municipally-owned enterprises and the data on local public 
expenditures and revenues included in the municipal core budget were provided by the 
statistical offices of the German Länder. Data pooling and adjustment was conducted by 
the Research Data Centre of the Federal Statistical Office in Berlin and the necessary 
data  aggregation  was  made  in  cooperation  with  the  Statistical  Office  of  Saxony-
Anhalt.12 Additional public finance or socioeconomic data such as the average house-
hold income, population, age structure, residential buildings, area, political majorities, 
etc. were extracted from the database regiostat (edited by the Federal Statistical Office 
and the statistical offices of the German Länder) and the statistical yearbook of the 
German Association of Cities and Towns (Association of German Cities, several years). 
                                                 
10  The city states Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg were excluded because they are both German states 
(Bundesländer) and local governments. It is not possible to attribute certain expenditures to one of 
these levels of government. 
11  In fact with regard to debts it was further reduced to 645 observations because for reasons unknown 
no debt figures even for the core budget were available for Solingen (Northrhine-Westphalia) and 
the years 1998 and 1999. 
12  I would like to take this opportunity to thank all of these institutions for their corporation and assis-







Variable  Unit  Obs.  Mean  SD  Max  Median  Min 
Dependent variables 
Total operational  




Euro per inhabitant  646  203.28  88.703 721.80  190.98  49.52 
Independent variables 
Household income 
Average disposable income  
of private households in Euro 
per inhabitant 
672  15974.02  2034.835  23027  15910  11481 
Property tax 
(“tax price”) 
Property tax revenue in Euro 
per inhabitant  672  125.10  32.949  274  125  49 
Grants received  Euro per inhabitant  672  368.20  193.709  864  326  -0.36 
Trade tax revenue  Euro per inhabitant  672  289.54  211.161  1619.06  241.90  -64.40 
Total municipal debt  Euro per inhabitant  651  3215.82  1351.393  8164.23  3056.40  401.46 
Indicators of misperception 
Municipal enterprise 
revenue 
Ratio municipal enterprise 
revenue to total revenues  645  0.3415  0.1543  0.7106   0.3555  0 
Local public enter-
prise debt 
Ratio long- and medium term 
liabilities of municipal  
enterprises to total local  
government debt 
645  0.5238  0.2358  0.9912  0.5506  0 
Owner-occupied 
houses 
Ratio buildings with up to 
two accommodation units to 
total residential buildings 
672  0.649  0.1063  0.8765  0.6531  0.3441 
Socioeconomic and political variables 
Population density  Inhabitants per square  
kilometer  672  1334.77  708.87  3968.54  1182.46  331.29 
Left  Percentage of councilors be-
longing to left-wing parties  672  0.4704  0.1055  0.8298  0.4667  0.20 
Political fragmenta-
tion 
Herfindahl index of squared 
party shares in the local  
council 
672  0.3303  0.0545  0.4811  0.3335  0.1919 
Recreational area  Hectares per inhabitant  672  0.0030  0.0016  0.0113  0.0026  0.0004 
Elderly  Ratio of people older than 
65 to total population  672  0.1809  0.0190  0.2417  0.1811  0.1091 
Youth  Ratio of people younger than 
21 to total population  672  0.1911  0.0153  0.2304  0.1900  0.1542 
Source: Author´s calculations.   
The currently about 323 German rural districts (Landkreise) had to be neglected for this 
study, because they have no right to levy taxes and their main sources of finance consist 
of transfer payments from the municipalities belonging to the particular district. The 
size and structure of the district budget is therefore rather a matter of negotiations be-
tween different levels of local governments than of fiscal illusion. The approximately 





und Gemeinden) have been also omitted – mainly because some necessary structural da-
ta was available only for the district level. A positive side-effect of this restriction to the 
independent cities is that no effects of spatial autocorrelation had to be taken into ac-
count for the regression analysis. 
3.3  Results 
According to the results of the FEM-estimation (Table 2), the average household in-
come has some positive effect, but not the proxy for the tax price. The complexity of the  
Table 2: 
Estimated Local Expenditure Function 
- Total Expenditures per Capita - 
  One-way FEM with AR (1) disturbances 
  Coefficient  Standard Error  t-value 
Property tax revenue  
per inhabitant  2.0421  1.2457  1.64 
Household income  0.0721  0.0247  2.92** 
Total municipal debt  0.0375  0.0183  2.05* 
Trade tax revenue per inhabitant  0.2464  0.0682  3.61 ** 
Grants received  0.5290  0.1484  3.56** 
Indicators of misperception 
Municipal enterprise revenue  2809.903  127.3193  22.07** 
Municipal enterprise debt  -112.2647  135.6141  -0.83 
Owner-occupied houses  -1185.144  2100.54  -0.56 
Socioeconomic and political variables 
Population density  -0.0961  0.2845  -0.34 
Elderly  4035.488  3175.638  1.27 
Youth  3270.541  4191.642  0.78 
Political fragmentation  477.313  476.3385  1.00 
Left  96.0451  289.9588  0.33 
Constant  -934.1055  1596.201  -0.59 
Number of observations = 527  i = 1 to 111 
t = 1998 to 2003  F(13, 403) = 53.57  Adj. R
2 = 0.5216 
Notes:  The  dependent  variable  is  total  operational  expenditures  per  inhabitant; * significant  at  the  5%  lev-
el. ** significant at the 1% level. 
Source:  Author´s calculations. 
revenue system seems to increase local public spending because of the significant and 
positive effect of the relative importance of municipal enterprise revenues. The same 
applies to the grants received and the trade tax revenues which possibly indicate the fly-
paper effect. The positive impact of total per capita debts seems to confirm the existence 
of debt illusion. The homeownership-rate proxy is not significant in the AR(1)-model so 





and especially the socioeconomic and political variables are also not significant. Proba-
bly the structural variables did not fluctuate very much over this period of six years and 
therefore their impact might have been absorbed by the group dummies. 
Table 3:  
Estimated Local Expenditure Function 
- “Voluntary” Municipal Expenditures per Capita - 
  One-way REM with AR (1) disturbances 
Independent variables  Coefficient  Standard error  z-value 
Recreational area  0.0449  0.0478  0.94 
Property tax revenue   0.2567  0.1209  2.12* 
Household income  0.4207  0.2480  1.70 
Total municipal debt   -0.0174  0.0551  -0.32 
Trade tax revenue   0.0056  0.0299  0.19 
Transfer payment received   0.0388  0.0334  1.16 
Indicators of misperception 
Municipal enterprise revenue  0.0596  0.0285  2.09* 
Municipal enterprise debt  0.0468  0.0344  1.36 
Owner-occupied houses  -1.0012  0.2146  -4.67** 
Socioeconomic and political variables 
Population density  -0.1640  0.0659  -2.49** 
Elderly  -0.7361  0.2685  -2.74** 
Youth  -1.608  0.3069  -5.24** 
Political fragmentation  -0.0488  0.1199  -0.41 
Left  0.0526  0.0967  0.54 
Constant  -3.5666  2.3839  -1.50 
N = 606  i = 1 to 110 
t = 1998 to 2003 
Wald χ
2(15) = 113.17   
Notes:  Dependent variable is total operational expenditures on science, culture, leisure, sport per inhabitant; all de-
pendent and independent variables are in logarithmic form; * significant at the 5% level, ** significant at the 
1% level. 
Source:  Author´s calculations. 
Table 3 shows that a significantly positive effect could be found for the ratio revenues 
of municipal enterprises to total revenues but also for the property tax revenue per inha-
bitant. Even more significant (and stronger) effects were detected for the share of own-
er-occupied houses, the population density and the shares of old and young people. The 
positive effect of the property tax revenue illustrates the difficulties in finding an ade-
quate tax price proxy at the German municipal level. The variable is rather an indicator 
for municipal own tax revenues. Renter illusion seems to be present due to the negative 
sign of the homeownership proxy, at least with regard to expenditures for cultural or lei-





Unlike for the total expenditures, demographic factors such as population density or the 
share of young or elderly persons have a negative impact on voluntary spending deci-
sions. Adolescents (or their parents on their behalf) or senior citizens seem to demand 
less of the selected cultural or leisure services than citizens of the 20 to 65 age bracket. 
The negative sign for the population density variable might indicate positive scale ef-
fects, but might also reflect the fact that in more densely populated cities the German 
Länder often run their own theatres (“Landestheater”). This reduces – ceteris paribus - 
the city´s own expenses on cultural services. But the significance of the negative effect 
of population density disappears if additional dummies for city size were included in the 
regression as well as a dummy for Eastern Germany. It turned out that only cities with a 
population lower than 50,000 have significantly lower per-capita expenditures – and on-
ly compared to cities with more than 50,000 and less than 500,000 inhabitants. Fur-
thermore, per-capita expenditures were significantly higher in Eastern Germany than in 
Western Germany. But as these findings do not alter the general results, the estimation 
results of the modified equation have not been presented here. 
Oates (1988, 78) points out that some of the variables used in empirical models in order 
to test for fiscal illusion might not be exogenous to the local government´s spending de-
cisions. This seems reasonable for the municipal tax revenues (especially the trade tax) 
and the municipal enterprise revenues because the local governments might be able to 
adjust the revenues from these sources to their planned expenditures by raising the tax 
rates or by forcing their municipal managers to increase the profitability of the local 
public enterprises. The total municipal debts and the relative share of the municipal en-
terprise debts are most probably exogenous in the short run as well as the grants re-
ceived. The latter mainly consist of transfers from the respective Bundesland – allocated 
according to a special key – to its local governments. Although, these transfers are sup-
posed to cover the difference between expenditures and revenues there is not much lee-
way for strategic behavior of the local governments. Neither overspending nor “under-
taxing” would alter the grants received significantly.13 
It should be noted that German local governments are under very strict supervision of 
the municipal supervisory authorities considering their budget deficits. Actually, debt 
increase is only allowed for investment purposes, not to cover operational expenses. Lo-
cal governments which are permanently unable to balance their budgets have to face 
something similar to private enterprises under liquidation: The local council and the 
mayor will be more or less disempowered and the municipal supervisory authority will 
                                                 
13  The allocation procedure is quite complex and cannot be discussed here in detail. See for example 
Haverkamp (1988) for further details. But there are three basic characteristics to mention: First, the 
calculated financial needs for each community have nothing to do with their actual expenditures; 
they simply depend on the total funds the Bundesland can share amongst its local governments. 
Second, larger cities receive higher grants per inhabitant than smaller cities and third, the hypotheti-
cal financial power is calculated by multiplying the municipal tax bases (property and trade tax) with 





have to approve every major spending decision. This treat probably enhances local gov-
ernment  budget  discipline  significantly  because  no  mayor  or  city  council  driving  a 
community in such a situation could expect to be reelected. 
A Hausman procedure14 was applied to test three variables for endogeneity: property 
tax revenue per inhabitant, trade tax revenue per inhabitant and the relative share of 
municipal enterprise revenues. In addition to the total expenditures per inhabitant as the 
endogenous variable, the local gross value added (per capita) was used for the trade tax 
and the total living space per inhabitant was used for the property tax as exogenous ex-
planatory variables. The relative proportion of municipal enterprise revenues was ex-
pected to depend on the population number, the local gross value added (per capita) and 
the local governments’ total per capita expenditures. According to the results of the F-
Test for all three variables, the exogeneity hypothesis could not be rejected for the fixed 
effects model. A similar estimation for the “voluntary” expenditures showed the same 
results. 
   
                                                 





4  Conclusions and Outlook 
The general target of this paper was to analyze the presence of fiscal illusion at the local 
government level in Germany. The special focus lay on the complexity illusion caused 
by the activities of municipal enterprises and their shadow budgets. It was assumed that 
not  only  the  net  revenue  transfers  from  these  enterprises  to  the  municipality´s  core 
budget cause fiscal illusion because for example public utility profits are often shifted 
directly to the municipal public transportation units. Even more important might be the 
fact that the mere “outsourcing” of municipal services from the core budget to the mu-
nicipal enterprises increases the complexity of the municipal expenditure and revenue 
system and therefore enhance the misperception of local tax prices. 
Similar studies do not exist for German local governments, mainly for two reasons: 
First, the popular median-voter model or other demand-driven models cannot be used as 
the theoretical basis because there is no German local tax to serve as a tax price for the 
bundle of different goods and services provided by the municipality. Second, a signifi-
cant share of the local government spending is not included in the municipal core budg-
et (Verwaltungs  und Vermögenshaushalt) but can be attributed to local public enter-
prises. Therefore, municipal spending and revenues could only be compared between ci-
ties and over time if the core budget and the local public enterprises were integrated into 
one single budget. While the first problem could not be solved sufficiently in this paper, 
an attempt was made to integrate the core budget and the budgets of local public enter-
prises. 
The estimation results of the simultaneous analysis for the various categories of fiscal il-
lusion listed in Section 2 were mixed, but the panel data regression analysis for German 
cities not belonging to a district revealed at least some evidence. Indications for the re-
levance of the complexity illusion hypothesis could be found because the ratio munici-
pal enterprise revenues to total revenues had a quite robust positive effect both on the 
total and the “voluntary” expenditures. Therefore, shadow budgets might probably in-
tensify the misperception of local government expenditures and revenues. Furthermore, 
at least with regard to the total per capita expenditures indications for the debt illusion 
and the flypaper hypothesis could be found. Unlike for the total expenditures, the share 
of owner-occupied houses had a negative and significant effect on the “voluntary ex-
penditures” (renter´s illusion hypothesis).15 
But the city´s expenses on sport, cultural or leisure services seem to be influenced also 
by demographic factors such as age structure or city size. On the other hand, political 
constellations seemed to be of no importance for municipal spending decisions. 
                                                 
15   As the burden of the German local property tax is hardly perceptible for homeowners the renter illu-
sion refers to the prices of other public goods provided by the municipality: water, energy, waste and 





Although the study did not primarily aim at confirming or rejecting the median voter 
model the findings showed that this popular approach might not be suited as a theoreti-
cal base for countries without local tax sources with broad tax bases. Therefore, it is ne-
cessary to apply alternative theoretical models to explain the interaction of demand and 
supply of local public goods and services. But this has to be left to future research work. 
Until then a certain degree of “ad hocery” (as Dollery and Worthington 1999, p. 40, put 
it) involved in the selection of independent variables for the regression analysis will be 
inevitable. 
The investigation also revealed that a reform of the German local public finance statistic 
is urgently needed. The reform should aim at integrating the official budgets as well as 
the financial statements of public enterprises into one consolidated budget.16 This is the 
only way to display a (approximately) true picture of the financial situation of the muni-
cipalities. 
                                                 
16  Actually, most German states have already initiated projects to adapt their municipal accounting sys-
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